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Abstract
Individual and national wealth accumulation is here modeled as a
recurrently played game between randomly matched pairs of individu-
als from a large population. The simple game here studied represents
exogenously and spontaneously arising productive opportunities, and
the drawn individuals may seek cooperation or conflict over each op-
portunity. How does national wealth and the evolutionarily stable co-
operation rate depend on natural resources and institutions? We show
that the steady-state level of national wealth is not monotonically in-
creasing with natural resources. We also study the evolution of the full
wealth distribution. When the population is large, the distribution of
individual wealth converges over time to a skewed distribution. We
also analyze the effect of institutions and the possibility that wealthier
individuals are more likely to win conflicts, including effects on national
wealth and inequality.
1 Introduction
One of the determinants of national wealth and its distribution is, arguably,
the availability and nature of natural resources. Hunter-gatherer societies
differ from agricultural societies, which in turn differ from industrialized and
post-industry societies. This paper develops a simple microeconomic model
of individual and national wealth accumulation, with a focus on individuals’
incentives to seek cooperation or conflict over available resources and pro-
duction opportunities. More precisely, wealth accumulation is modelled as a
symmetric game that is recurrently played between pairs of individuals who
are randomly drawn from a large population. For the sake of definiteness
and brevity, we focus on a few variants of the so-called Hawk-Dove game.
This game (also called "Chicken") was used by Maynard Smith and Price
(1973) as an illustration of the possibility of an evolutionarily stable mixed
strategy in symmetric finite games. They considered the expected payoffs
∗This manuscript builds upon an incomplete sketch by one of the authors, see Weibull
(1999). The present paper is a significant extension and elaboration of that sketch.
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in case of a conflict, while we here consider the fully specified game in which
one individual wins and the other loses. In addition, we consider versions
that include (rudiments of) institutions as well as versions in which individ-
uals may differ in fighting ability and this, in turn, may depend on personal
wealth. Indeed, while they did not consider any population dynamics, the
main focus here is on the induced population process under the presumption
that the resource in question is storable, to be called wealth. Wealth depre-
ciates (or is consumed) at a constant rate. National wealth is defined in per
capita terms, as total population wealth divided by population size. One of
our main findings is that national wealth is not monotonically related to the
riches of the country. As the riches increase, steady-state national wealth
first increases, then diminishes, then again increases. Hence, the model may
provide yet another explanation for the "curse of the riches". Among exist-
ing explanations, the present model is perhaps closest to the "rent-seeking"
explanation, see Torres et al. (2013) for a recent survey and discussion.1
While individual may well be animals that contest resources, as in Maynard-
Smith’s and Price’s original contribution (see also Enquist and Leimar 1984,
1987, 1990), we here interpret the model in economic terms, imagining that
each arrival of a Hawk-Dove game opportunity represents opportunities for
co-production or trade that spontaneously arise in a large population living
in a given natural and institutional environment. Whenever such an op-
portunity arises, each of the two individuals may seek “cooperation" (play
"Dove") or "conflict" (play "Hawk"). If both seek cooperation, they split
the value of the opportunity at hand in equal shares. If both seek conflict,
one of them wins the opportunity (potentially at some cost) and the other
individual makes a loss. In the base-line setting all individuals have the
same probability to win such a fight, while in an extension, the probabilities
may depend on individual wealth. If one individual seeks cooperation and
the other conflict, the latter wins the opportunity and the former neither
receives nor loses anything. In an extension of this basic model, we ana-
lyze the role for wealth creation of (societally costly) enforcement of a law
against strategy "Hawk", with the implication that an individual who played
H against D may be sued and have to pay a (potentially large) fine.
Our main contribution in this study, however, is methodological, namely
to provide a mathematically rigorous model framework for analysis of stochas-
tic population processes that involve perpetually recurring strategic interac-
tions between individuals. Our model is therefore based on heroic simplifi-
cations that are not intended to be realistic but that permit us to establish
powerful analytical results.
The material is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define a stochastic
1The ‘curse of riches’ or ‘curse of natural resources’ is an empirical result from the 1990s
that shows a negative correlation, in cross-country studies, between countries’ natural-
resource abundance and their economic growth, after controlling for other relevant vari-
ables.
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version of the Hawk-Dove game, and define a Markov process for individual
wealth holdings in a finite and infinitely-lived population, a process that, at
random arrival times involves pairwise strategic interactions and potential
depreciation of individuals’ wealth. In this and the next two sections we
assume that all individuals have identical winning probabilities in fights and
that they all use the unique evolutionarily stable strategy of the Hawk-Dove
game. In Section 3 we first establish (in Theorem 1) that the so-defined
wealth process is ergodic and converges from any initial wealth distribution
to a unique invariant wealth distribution. We then (in Theorem 2) show that
the larger the population, the less correlated are the wealth levels within in
any finite group of individuals (of fixed size), and, in the limit as population
size tends to infinity, these wealth levels become statistically independent
and identically distributed. We also provide a system of ordinary differen-
tial equations for the probability distribution of a representative individual’s
wealth—in the limit of an infinitely large population—at any given point in
time, a result that is valid with or without depreciation. Using these differ-
ential equations, we solve (in Corollary 1) for the evolution of the mean-value
and variance of a representative individual’s wealth in the limit of an infinite
population. The evolution of per capita national wealth is analyzed and we
provide a mean-field approximation (in Proposition 1) for large population.
We also use this mean-field approximation to establish the above-mentioned
"curse of the riches" result. Section 4 considers a few alternative strategies in
the recurrently played Hawk-Dove game, in particular threshold strategies
whereby individuals let their strategy depend on their own current wealth,
by way of playing Hawk when rich and Dove when poor. By and large,
the unique ESS of the Hawk-Dove game appears to resist "invasions" by
such alternative strategies. Section 5 considers three extensions. First, we
briefly study the effect of a potential law against strategy Hawk, with so-
cietally costly enforcement. For sufficiently low enforcement costs, this can
raise national wealth (and potentially diminish inequality). Second, by way
of numerical simulation we study the dynamics of national wealth and its
distribution when "wealth means strength". It is seen how this may en-
hance national wealth (by avoiding fights between uneven contestants) and
also (persistent) inequality. Third, we show how the algebra can be easily
adapted to settings in which the strategic interaction at hand is not the only
source of wealth. Section 6 concludes. All mathematical proof are given in
an Appendix at the end of the paper.
2 Model
Consider a population consisting of a large finite number N of individuals
who are now and then randomly matched in pairs to play a fully specified
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version of the classical Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973).2
This game is defined by two positive parameters, v and c, and each player has
only two pure strategies, H ("hawk") and D (”dove”). The paired individuals
make their strategy choices simultaneously. If both choose D, they each
receive v/2 payoff units. If exactly one of them chooses H, then this player
earns payoff v while the other loses or earns nothing. If both choose H, then
one wins v and the other loses c, with equal probability for both individuals
to be the "winner" of such a "fight". We will call the strategy profile DD
compromise and the strategy profile HH fight. The game tree is shown in
Figure 1 below. The material gains and losses to individual i are indicated
above those of individual j. If both play H, then "nature" (player 0) makes
a random draw, resulting in a "winner" and a "loser", with equal chance for
both individuals.3
Figure 1: The fully specified Hawk-Dove game
Individuals accumulate their payoffs over time, and an individual’s (pos-
itive or negative) stock of accumulated payoffs at any point in time is called
the individual’s current wealth. Hence, an individual i ∈ {1, ..., N} who en-
ters an interaction with wealth w, exits the interaction with wealth w+ v/2
if both play D, with wealth w + v if she plays H and the opponent plays
D, and with unchanged wealth, w, if she plays D and the opponent plays
H. If both play H, she will end up with either wealth w + v, which hap-
pens with probability one half, or with wealth w − c, while the the other
individual in the match will end up with the reversed wealth levels. In
terms of "national wealth", that is, total wealth in the population, all three
strategy profiles DD, DH and HD thus results in an increase by v, while
the strategy profile HH, a fight, results in a net increase of national wealth
by v − c units. This simple and well-known game, though usually treated
2We here depart slightly from Maynard Smith and Price (1973), and the usual treat-
ment in evolutionary game theory, where expected, not realized, payoffs are considered.
3An interesting extension of this model is to let the two individuals’ wealth influence
the winning probability, see comments at the end of the paper.
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only in terms of expected payoffs and without any wealth dynamics, has a
unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), namely to use pure strategy H
with probability x∗ = min {1, v/c}. We assume throughout that c and v are
positive integers.4
We now turn to a specification of the associated stochastic wealth pro-
cess. Individuals may condition their strategy choice in a match on their
own current wealth and, on the current wealth distribution in the population
at large. However, they may not condition their behavior on the opponent’s
current wealth (which the individual may not even know), nor on any earlier
event, or on chronological time.
In addition to the above, we allow for the possibility that wealth stochas-
tically depreciates over time at some constant (nonnegative) rate. By letting
the amount of lost wealth via depreciation always take integer values, the
state space of the process remains the same as without depreciation.
To be more precise, at each time t ∈ R+, the state of the wealth process
WN is defined by the vector WN (t) =
(
WN1 (t), ...,WNN (t)
)
∈ ZN of individ-
ual wealth holdings, WNi (t). The associated empirical measure, or current
wealth distribution, is denoted
µN (t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
δWNi (t)
. (1)
Likewise, average wealth, or, equivalently, per capita national wealth, is de-
noted
W¯N (t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
WNi (t). (2)
The wealth processWN changes state precisely at the arrival times T1 <
T2 < ... of the underlying Poisson process, which is stationary and has
intensity λ = 2N . At each such arrival time, there is first a random draw.
With probability one half one individual is uniformly randomly drawn for
wealth depreciation. With probability one half, instead a pair of individuals
is randomly drawn to play the game. This means that any given individual
in the population is drawn for wealth depreciation at unit time rate and is
drawn for game play at approximately twice that time rate; more precisely
at rate N · (1/N + 1/(N − 1)).
In the first event, depreciation takes the form of depleting completely
the selected individual’s wealth, irrespective of it is positive or negative.5
Thus, for any given wealth level WNi (T ) at the arrival time T of the Poisson
process, either the individual’s wealth remains intact, or it vanishes, with
4The key assumption is that there is a smallest unit of wealth, an assumption that is
useful for the stochastic analysis.
5For a discussion of negative wealth, see Section 6.
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probability δ ∈ [0, 1] for the latter event. We will call δ the depreciation
rate.
In the second event, that of a random pairwise match, two individu-
als from the population are uniformly randomly drawn to play the game.
Depending on their strategy choices in the game G (v, c), and depending
on who wins the fight if there is one, their wealth holdings change accord-
ingly, as described above. In order to specify these strategic interactions
in the pairwise matchings we define "behavior rules" that determine what
individuals do in the game G (v, c) whenever it is their turn to play. By
a (stationary) behavior rule for an individual i we here mean any Borel
measurable function ξi : Z ×∆ → [0, 1] that maps the individual’s current
wealth, WNi (t) ∈ Z and the current wealth distribution, µN (t) ∈ ∆, where
∆ =
{
y ∈ `∞+ (Z) :
∑+∞
i=−∞ yi = 1
}
is the unit simplex in `∞ (Z), to a proba-
bility xi = ξi
(
WNi (t) , µN (t)
)
∈ [0, 1] for using strategy H in the individual’s
next random match (the first arrival time T ≥ t at which the individual is
drawn for a match). Each individual i in the population is equipped with
one such function ξi and uses it throughout time. Let ξ = (ξi)Ni=1 be the
population profile of behavior rules.
The described events of depreciation and matching are all statistically
independent. Given the underlying game G (v, c), the population profile ξ
of behavior rules, and the depreciation probabilities δ, WN =
〈
WN (t)
〉
t∈R+
constitutes a Markov process in ZN .6
3 The evolution of individual wealth
In this section we analyze statistical properties of the population wealth
process under the presumption that all individuals always use the evolu-
tionarily stable strategy in game G (v, c), that is, use the behavior rule
ξi
(
WNi (t) , µN (t)
)
≡ x∗ = min {v/c, 1}. Other behavior rules will be con-
sidered in Section 5.
We first consider its long-run behavior over time, at any fixed and given
population size N ∈ N. A key question is history dependence. Can the
wealth distribution go in different directions, depending on the initial wealth
distribution? Our first result establishes that in the long run, this is not pos-
sible. Irrespective of what the initial distribution is, the wealth distribution
will over time tend asymptotically to the same limit.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that δ > 0 and that all individuals always use strat-
egy x∗. The wealth process
〈
WN (t)
〉
t∈R+
is then ergodic and has a unique
6For a more general depreciation distribution, δ is here replaced by the full distribution,
q.
6
invariant distribution, to which it converges in distribution from all initial
states.
Second, we consider how the wealth process behaves, at any fixed and
given time, when the population size N is very large. More precisely, we
analyze the law of motion of any given individual’s wealth when population
size N goes to infinity, for the case v < c. In order to state the result,
we write L(X) for the probability distribution of a random variable X and
(L(Xi))⊗k for the (product) probability distribution of k such i.i.d. random
variables Xi.
Suppose that the initial individual wealth levels, the random variables
WNi (0), for i = 1, ..., N , are i.i.d. pi (irrespective of population size N). We
have the following "propagation of chaos" result, which, unlike the preceding
result holds for all δ ∈ [0, 1]:7
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that v < c and that all individuals always use strat-
egy x∗. For any probability distribution pi on Z there exists a Markov process
W˜ =
〈
W˜ (t)
〉
t∈R+
in Z, with L(W˜ (0)) = pi, such that for any number k ∈ N
of individuals:
lim
N→+∞
L(WN1 , . . . ,WNk ) =
(
L(W˜ )
)⊗k
. (3)
Moreover, for any wealth level w ∈ Z and time t ∈ R+:
∂
∂t
P
[
W˜ (t) = w
]
= 2
(
1− v
c
)2
· P
[
W˜ (t) = w − v/2
]
(4)
+2
(
1− v
c
)
v
c
·
(
P
[
W˜ (t) = w − v
]
+ P
[
W˜ (t) = w
])
+
(
v
c
)2
·
(
P
[
W˜ (t) = w − v
]
+ P
[
W˜ (t) = w + c
])
−2 · P
[
W˜ (t) = w
]
−Dw
where Dw = δ · P
[
W˜ (t) = w
]
for all integers w 6= 0, and D0 = −δ ·(
1− P
[
W˜ (t) = 0
])
.
The process W˜ can be thought of as the wealth dynamics of a repre-
sentative individual. The first part of this theorem, the convergence result
(3), establishes that the larger the population, the less correlated are the
wealth levels within in any finite group of individuals (of fixed size k), and,
7For a more precise statement of the convergence result, see the proof of Theorem 2 in
the appendix.
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in the limit as population size tends to infinity, these wealth levels become
statistically independent. Moreover, the probability distribution of each in-
dividual’s wealth, WN1 (t) at any given time t > 0, tends to the distribution
of the random variable W˜ as population size N tends to infinity. The evo-
lution of this distribution over time is given in equation (4). For any integer
level of wealth w, P(W˜ (t) = w) is the population share of individuals, in an
infinite population, with that wealth level. The different terms in the evo-
lution equation represent different "inflows" and "outflows" from any given
wealth level w ∈ Z. More precisely, there are three inflows, from wealth
levels w − v/2, w − v and w + c, and there are two outflows, one because
individuals are drawn to play the game and one because of depreciation of
wealth. The coefficients in equation (4) can be obtained from Figure 1 by
multiplying probabilities downwards from the terminal nodes to the root
of the tree, under the hypothesis that individual i at the root has wealth
w, and using the fact that the average time rate of game-playing for an
individual is 2 in the limit as N → ∞. The wealth level zero, however, is
special if δ > 0 in that it has no depreciation outflow. Instead, it has an
extra inflow, emanating from depreciation of the wealth of individuals with
non-zero wealth.8 In the absence of depreciation, Dw = 0 for all w ∈ Z.
One may use equation (4) to derive the laws of motion for the first and
second moments of the distribution of a representative individual’s wealth
W˜ (t) at any point in time, granted δ > 0. Let
α = v
δ
(
1− v
c
)
and β2 = v
2
2δ
[
3−
(
1− v
c
)2]
. (5)
Corollary 3.3. If v < c and δ > 0, and if the initial distribution pi has
finite mean and variance, then there exist K1,K2,K3 ∈ R such that
E
[
W˜ (t)
]
= α+K1e−δt ∀t ≥ 0
V ar
[
W˜ (t)
]
= α2 + β2 +
(
K2t+K3e−δt
)
e−δt ∀t ≥ 0
From this we obtain the asymptotic mean value and variance:
lim
t→∞E
[
W˜ (t)
]
= α and lim
t→∞V ar
[
W˜ (t)
]
= α2 + β2 (6)
We note that the asymptotic Sharpe ratio decreases with the depreciation
rate and approaches unity as δ → 0:9
lim
t→∞
E
[
W˜ (t)
]
√
V ar
[
W˜ (t)
] =
[
1 + 3δ
2 (1− v/c)2 −
δ
2
]−1/2
. (7)
8A more realistic modelling of depreciation would not have this feature. However, such
a richer model would not allow the analytical tractability we now have.
9In finance, the Sharpe ratio is a way to adjust the expected return to an investment
for its risk. It is named after William F. Sharpe.
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This equation shows that the dispersion of wealth has two sources: on the
one hand the strategic interaction, giving rise to individual gains and losses
and resulting in unit Sharpe ratio, and deprecation of individual wealth,
which increases the dispersion by now and then knocking away all wealth
from an individual, resulting in a significant population share with wealth
near zero. It is noteworthy that the wealth dispersion emanating from the
strategic interaction does not depend on the game parameters v and c. We
conjecture that this is due to the equilibrium nature of the assumed behavior
rule. For if v < c, then the expected net wealth gain is the same for both
pure strategies, irrespective of what values v and c have.
Figure 2 below shows the wealth distribution obtained by way of numeri-
cal simulation in a population of size N = 2, 000 and observed at arrival time
T = 200, 000 of the Poisson process, when, initially all individuals had zero
wealth. The Hawk-Dove game parameter values were v = 2 and c = 4, and
the depreciation rate δ = 0.1. At these parameter values, the asymptotic
mean value is limt→∞E
[
W˜ (t)
]
= 10 and the asymptotic standard devia-
tion is limt→∞
√
V ar
[
W˜ (t)
]
≈ 12.5. The empirical average in the numerical
simulation is approximately 10.1 and the empirical standard deviation 13.8.
Figure 2: The wealth distribution for a representative individual when t is
large
The diagram shows how the drift, expressed analytically in (4), creates
a spread of the wealth distribution, with a peak at zero wealth, due to our
9
simplistic specification of how depreciation occurs; it is assumed to take ran-
domly drawn individuals’ wealth to zero every now and then. The empirical
wealth distribution is apparently close to its steady-state distribution, as
given in Theorem 3.1. We also note that the empirical steady-state distri-
bution is quite screwed, with median far below the mean value: 6 versus
10.1.
4 The evolution of per capita national wealth
Having considered the full-dimensional population wealth process, we now
turn to the evolution of national wealth, defined on a per capita basis. Let T
be any arrival time of the Poisson process that drives the population process,
and let W¯N (T ) be average wealth in the population at this time. Hence,
"national" wealth, if the population represents a nation, is NW¯N (T ). At
this arrival time, one of two equally probable events will take place: (A)
one individual is selected for wealth depreciation, (B) a pair of individuals
are selected to play the game G. In the first event (A), the wealth of one
randomly drawn individual in the population is taken to zero with probabil-
ity δ. Accordingly, average wealth in the population decreases by a random
integer amount Y N , the expected value of which, conditional upon W¯N (T ),
is δ · W¯N (T )/N . In the second event (B), let
p
(
WN (t)
)
= 1
N (N − 1) ·
∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
ξi
[
WNi (t) , µN (t)
]
· ξj
[
WNj (t) , µN (t)
]
.
(8)
This is the probability for a fight between the two individuals. Depending on
the distribution of behavior rules, average wealth either increases by v/N (if
they play DD, DH or HD) or changes by the (positive or negative) amount
(v − c) /N (if they play HH), with probability p
(
WN (t)
)
for the latter.
In sum, average wealth at all times t in the interval until the next arrival
time, T ′, or, more exactly, ∀t ∈ (T, T ′], is
W¯N (t) = W¯N (T ) + 1
N
·

−Y N with probability 1/2
v − c with probability p
(
WN (T )
)
/2
v otherwise
,
(9)
Suppose that each individual, when matched, strives to maximize his or
her expected wealth gain in the interaction. It is easily verified from the
payoffs in the game that H is then optimal if and only if the probability that
one’s opponent will play H, p
(
WN (t)
)
, does not exceed x∗ = min {1, v/c}.
In particular, H is the unique optimal strategy if v > c. If v = c, then H is the
unique optimal strategy if p
(
WN (t)
)
< 1, and both H and D are optimal
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if p
(
WN (t)
)
= 1. If v < c, then H is the unique optimal strategy when
p
(
WN (t)
)
< v/c, D the unique optimal strategy when p
(
WN (t)
)
> v/c,
and otherwise both strategies are optimal.
4.1 The case v < c
In this classical case in evolutionary game theory the unique evolutionarily
stable strategy is to play H with probability x∗ = v/c. If everybody else
in the population uses this strategy, then it is an optimal strategy for each
individual (presuming they strive to maximize the expected wealth gain in
each interaction. Indeed, this is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
strategy in the population game for any N . However, with N finite, there
also exist other, asymmetric population equilibria. For instance, let N > 3,
and suppose that individual 1 plays H, individual 2 plays D, and all others
randomize and play H with probability
x = (N − 1)v − c(N − 3) c . (10)
The probability that an opponent to any individual i > 3 will play H is then
exactly v/c, which makes all such individuals indifferent between H and D.
The probability that an opponent to individual 1 will play H is less than v/c,
so H is that individual’s unique best reply. Likewise, the probability that
an opponent to player 2 will play H exceeds v/c, and thus D is that player’s
unique best reply. In sum, the population strategy profile (H,D, x, x, ..., x)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the population game.
In the unique symmetric population equilibrium, the probability for con-
flict in each random match is q∗ = v2/c2. We conjecture that this probability
is a good approximation of the probability of fights in all equilibria for N
large. For even in the polar case to symmetric equilibrium, namely, when all
individuals i < Nv/c play H and the others D (and Nv/c is not an integer),
the probability of a fight in a random matching also tends to q∗:
lim
N→∞
qN = lim
N→∞
(bNv/cc
N
· bNv/cc − 1
N
)
=
(
v
c
)2
= q∗. (11)
Another conjecture is that, when N is large, the average wealth process
follows closely the solution trajectories of the mean-field equations. To make
this precise, suppose that all individuals in all matches play the unique
ESS, x∗ = v/c. Taking expectations in (9) suggests the following time-
homogeneous ordinary differential equation for the dynamics of expected
average wealth, w(t) = E
[
W¯N (t) | W¯N (t) = wo
]
:
w˙(t) = v (1− v/c)− δw(t) ∀t ≥ 0 (12)
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with initial state w (0) = w0. This mean-field equation has a unique solution,
〈w(t)〉t≥0, defined by
w(t) = α+ (w0 − α) e−δt ∀t ≥ 0. (13)
If the depreciation rate δ is positive, then this solution, irrespective of its
initial state, converge, as t→ +∞, to the unique steady-state level:
w∗ = α = lim
t→∞E
[
W˜ (t)
]
. (14)
Moreover, in a well-defined sense, the solution to the mean-field equa-
tion (12) indeed is a good approximation of the stochastic process in large
populations. In order to state this approximation result, let C∞c (R) denote
the class of smooth functions f : R→ R with compact support.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that δ > 0 and let 〈w(t)〉t≥0 be the solution to
(12) with initial value w0. For any t > 0 and any f ∈ C∞c (R):
lim
N→∞
E(
[
f(W¯N (t)) | W¯N (0) = w0
]
) = f(w(t)) ∀t ≥ 0
We also note wealth increases linearly over time if the depreciation rate
δ is zero. Then
w(t) = w0 + v
(
1− v
c
)
t ∀t ≥ 0, (15)
for any initial wealth level w0 ∈ R.
4.2 The case v > c
What happens if the opportunity value v exceeds the damage cost c? Then
it is always optimal to play strategy H. Hence, the equilibrium probability
for fights is 1. Suppose that this is what all individuals do. Then the the
mean-field equation for average wealth becomes
w˙(t) = v − c− δw(t) . (16)
Accordingly, all solutions, irrespective of initial conditions, converge to the
steady state level
w∗ = v − c
δ
. (17)
The above approximation results hold as stated, with equation (12) re-
placed by equation (16). Also in this case average wealth increases linearly
over time if δ = 0:
w(t) = w0 + (v − c) t ∀t ≥ 0. (18)
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4.3 Comparative statics
Combining equations (14) and (17) we obtain the following general expres-
sion for the unique steady-state level of average wealth, associated with any
positive depreciation rate δ:
w∗ = max
{
v
δ
(
1− v
c
)
,
v − c
δ
}
(19)
Not surprisingly, the steady-state level of average wealth is lower the
higher is its depreciation rate. However, the equation also shows a feature
that may be less expected, namely, that steady-state average wealth, or,
equivalently, national wealth, is non-monotonic in both the value v of op-
portunities and in the cost c of a lost conflict. This non-monotonicity is
illustrated in the two diagrams below. Figure 3 shows steady-state average
wealth as a function of v, for c = 3 and δ = 1. Figure 4 shows steady-state
wealth as a function of c for v = 3 and δ = 1.
Figure 3: Steady-state average wealth as a function of the value v in game
G(v, c)
Given c > 0, the steady-state level of average wealth is a parabolic
function of the opportunity value v, with w∗ = 0 when v = 0 and also when
v = c. The reason why w∗ is zero when v = c is that then all matched pairs
have a conflict, and thus national wealth accumulation per match is then
v − c = 0. Hence, national wealth depreciates toward zero over time from
any initial level. Hence, national wealth is non-monotonic in v. The reason
why w∗ is also non-monotonic in c, the damage in case of a lost conflict, is
the other side of the same coin. One way to view this is to note that the
equilibrium probability for conflict when c > v is v2/c2, a probability that
falls faster than the damage c per conflict increases. In this sense, the more
damage an individual who loses a conflict suffers, the fewer conflicts there
13
Figure 4: Steady-state average wealth as a function of the cost c in game
G(v, c)
are in equilibrium, and the wealthier will society be in steady state. Hence,
contrary to what one might first think, a reduction of c, for example by some
legal institutional arrangement or some insurance policy, may increase the
frequency of fights and reduce the equilibrium level of national wealth.
All of the above concerns positive depreciation rates. We noted above
that if instead the depreciation rate is zero, then average wealth grows lin-
early over time. When v < c, the growth rate is g = v (1− v/c). This rate
is increasing in c but non-monotonic in v, and maximal when v = c/2.
5 Threshold strategies
Here we explore more adaptive strategies, strategies adapted to the indi-
vidual’s own current wealth and on the current wealth distribution in the
population. The first class of such strategies we here examine are dynamic
threshold strategies, according to which the individual compares his or her
current wealth with a threshold that may change over time and that may
depends on the current empirical wealth-distribution at large. Formally,
such a strategy is a function: ξi of own wealth, WNi (t), and the wealth
distribution, µN (t), defined in (1), such that the individual i plays H if his
or her wealth exceeds some threshold, τi
(
µN (t)
)
∈ R, and otherwise plays
D, where τi is a Borel measurable function: now defined as in the model
section, that is, as a probability:
ξi
(
µNi (t),WNi (t)
)
=
{
0 if WNi (t) ≤ τi
(
µN (t)
)
1 otherwise
(20)
A special case is when the threshold is constant, τi (µ(t)) ≡ wˆi for some
14
wˆi ∈ R. If wˆi ≥ c then WNi (t) ≥ c for all t ≥ 0. Hence, an individual with
such a threshold never goes "bankrupt". Another case is when the threshold
is dynamic and such that τi (µ(t)) equals the qi-quantile of the population’s
current wealth distribution, for some fixed quantile (as measured from the
bottom of the distribution). A particularly interesting case for consider-
ations of evolutionary stability is the v/c-quantile when v < c, since this
results in the same probability for playing H as under the ESS x∗ (in the
static Hawk-Dove game). Formally, let τ∗ be the threshold defined as the
minimal wealth level such that
1
N
N∑
j=1
1{WNj (t)>w} ≤ x
∗ (21)
We proceed by way of computer simulations. Let N = 2000, v = 2, c = 4,
and δ = 0.1. Hence, w∗ = α = 100. Figure 5 below shows average steady-
state wealth in a population where initially all individuals use strategy x∗
and per-capita wealth is near its steady-state value. Suddenly 10% of the
population switch to a threshold strategy adapted to the 30% bottom wealth
quantile. The diagram suggests that these “mutants” on average fare less
well than the incumbents.
Figure 5: Mutants using threshold strategy adapted to the 30 % bottom
quantile of the wealth distribution
Figure 6 below shows a similar simulation experiment, but now the mu-
tants instead use a threshold strategy adapted to the 50% quantile, that is,
median wealth. They appear to fare about as well as the incumbents who
use x∗. The reason is that x∗ assigns probability v/c = 0.5 to play of H, and
so does the mutant threshold strategy. This mutant strategy thus mimics
strategy x∗.
Figure 7 below shows a similar simulation as in Figures 5 and 6, but now
the mutants instead use a fixed mixed strategy, assigning probability x = 0.9
to H. A single such mutant in a large population would fare (approximately)
just as well as the incumbents, but since the mutants here make up 10% of
the population they sometimes meet each other and then fight with each
other with a higher probability than the incumbent, so their subpopulation
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Figure 6: Mutants using threshold strategy adapted to the median wealth
loses wealth at a higher rate than the incumbents. Hence, again strategy x∗
shows robustness against mutants.
Figure 7: Mutants using fixed mixed strategy that plays H with probability
0.9
It is beyond the scope of this essay to probe deeper into evolutionary
stability analysis. A topic for future research.
6 Extensions
We will briefly consider two extensions, where the first concerns the
introduction of (embryonic forms of ) institutions, and the second concerns
allowing for the (arguably realistic) possibility that higher personal wealth
increases the chance of winning a fight.
6.1 Institutions
We here consider a simple generalization of the Hawk-Dove game in Figure 8,
see diagram below. The new parameters are a and b, where 0 ≤ a < 1/2 and
b ≥ 0. The interpretation of a is institutional. It represents, in a simplistic
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way, enforcement of a law against strategy H, where now v is interpreted as
the value of jointly owned asset, such as a partnership or business, and H
is interpreted as an effort to steal the asset. In view of the possibility that
the victim may bring the case to court and win the case, this reduces the
expected value of playing H, when the other party plays D, from the full
value of the asset, v, to (1− a) v. The expected compensation of the victim
is assumed to be av. Hence, the effect to wealth in society at large is zero.
Evidently, a legal system and its enforcement is costly for society, a topic
we will bring up shortly. The parameter b represents the realistic feature
of fights that also the winner usually makes some loss, where we here take
the expected loss to the share b of the asset’s value. When both play H,
we neglect the possibility that the case be brought to court. The original
Hawk-Dove game is the special case when a = b = 0.
Figure 8: A generalized version of the Hawk-Dove game.
The game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium if
v
c
<
1
1− 2a− b , (22)
namely, to play strategy H with probability
x∗ = 1− 2a
c+ bv · v. (23)
Moreover, this mixed strategy is evolutionarily stable. (Indeed, the normal
form of the generalized game is a Hawk-Dove game.) We note that the equi-
librium probability for H is decreasing in the legal enforcement parameter
a and tends to zero as a → 1/2. Not surprisingly, the probability is also
decreasing in the damage parameter b.
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The steady state level of per capita wealth, in the base-line model given
in (19), now becomes
w∗ = v
δ
(
1− 1− 4a (1− a)
c/v + b
)
, (24)
Hence, national gross wealth, when not accounting for the societal costs
of law enforcement, is increasing in the enforcement parameter a and in
the damage parameter b. Although gross wealth is decreasing the damage
parameter b when the probability for H is kept fixed, in equilibrium individu-
als reduce its probability sufficiently to make damages from fighting socially
beneficial. Hence the beneficial effect of b.
Law enforcement is of course in practice costly. Let C (a, x∗) be the per
capita cost of enforcement a. Then national net wealth becomes
W = v
δ
(
1− 1− 4a (1− a)
c/v + b
)
− C
(
a,
1− 2a
c/v + b
)
. (25)
Figure 9 below shows two numerical simulations, both with v = 10,
c = 20,δ = 0.1 and both with N = 2, 000. One curve shows the distribution
of wealth under laissez-faire, a = 0, then other under a law against strategy
H, with law enforcement a = 0.4. This law and its enforcement increases
average gross wealth from approximately 52 to approximately 95, the median
from around 35 to around 64, and increases the empirical standard deviation
from about 67 to about 99. Hence, even fairly costly law enforcement will
increase net wealth and diminish inequality.
Figure 9: Numerical simulations under laissez-faire and under law enforce-
ment
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6.2 When wealth is strength
So far, we have assumed that all individuals have the same chance of winning
a fight. Arguably, wealthier individuals by and large have a higher proba-
bility of winning, against a given opponent, than poorer individuals. In the
animal kingdom, "wealth" may simply be body weight or muscular mass,
while among humans, wealth may consist in part in defence buildings, at-
tack weaponry, or availability to good lawyers. We here only briefly outline
how our base-line model can be generalized to allow for such dependencies.
As before, let v ∈ 2N, c ∈ N, and now assume v < c. Consider two indi-
viduals who are have been randomly matched, with wealth levels w1, w2 ∈ Z.
If both playD each gets a payoff v/2, and if one playsH and the otherD, the
H-player gets v and the D-player gets zero. However, if both play H, then
player 1 "wins" with probability f(w1, w2) and gains wealth v, while player 2
loses wealth c. With the complementary probability, 1− f(w1, w2), player 2
wins and 1 loses. We assume symmetry: f(w2, w1) = 1− f(w1, w2). For the
sake of concreteness, we focus on the special case when f : R2 → [0, 1] is a
logistic version of Tullock’s contest function (reference to Tullock), defined
by
f(w1, w2) =
exp(λw1)
exp(λw1) + exp(λw2)
∀w1, w2 ∈ R (26)
for some λ ≥ 0. We note that this generalization includes the original HD
game as the special case when λ = 0; then f(w1, w2) ≡ 1/2.
A number of plausible and relevant information scenarios open up. In
one scenario, each individual only knows his or her own wealth, in another
scenario, any two matched individuals perfectly observe each others’ wealth.
In a third scenario, covering the first two, each individual in a match knows
her own wealth and receives a noisy private signal about the opponent’s
wealth. We here sketch how the second scenario can be analyzed within the
present framework.
Assume, thus, that two individuals have just been matched, and they
both know each other’s wealth. For player i = 1, 2, strategy H strictly
dominates D if and only if (v + c) f(wi, wj) > c, or, equivalently if and only
if
wi − wj > 1
λ
ln
(
c
v
)
(27)
where j 6= i. The so defined game (under complete information) has the
following Nash equilibria:
• Suppose that (27) holds for i = 1. Then the only Nash equilibrium
is (H,D), that is, the rich individual grabs the "cake" and the poor
individual "yields".
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• Suppose that (27) holds for i = 2. Then the only NE is (D,H). Again
the rich individual grabs the cake and the poor yields.
• Suppose that
|w1 − w2| < λ−1 ln
(
c
v
)
. (28)
Then there are three Nash equilibria: two strict, (H,D) an (D,H),
and one mixed. In the latter equilibrium, player i = 1, 2 plays H with
probability x∗i ∈ (0, 1), defined by
x∗i =
v
2 (v + c) f(wi, wj)− v . (29)
In sum: when wealth levels are widely apart, then the poorer individual
necessarily plays D and the richer individual takes home the whole "cake".
When wealth levels are not widely apart, there are three "conventions". In
one, the rich individual takes the cake, in another, the poor individual takes
the cake, and i the third convention, they both randomize between H and
D.10 If the wealth levels happen to be identical, then we are back in the
base-line model, since there is then no coordination device available to the
pair of individuals (individual wealth serves as such a coordination device),
and hence the arguably natural assumption is that they will then both play
the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy.
Remark. It is well-known in biology that animals who contest a resource
many times avoid fighting, and thereby avoid damage, by way of judging
each other’s strength. Contestants also often try to impress each other by
demonstrating or exaggerating their body size, muscular strength, and/or
vocal resources (gorilla males beating their chests, dogs burring up their
fur, frogs blowing up their cheeks, etc.). Usually, fights occur only if the
two contestants appear approximately equally strong. Arguably, similar
phenomena, including avoidance of fights with predictable outcomes, are
common also among humans. For mathematical models of animal fighting,
see Enquist and Leimar (1984, 1987, 1990).
Figure 10 below shows two long-run wealth distributions from numerical
simulations.
In both simulations, the number of individuals is N ≈ 2000, the game
parameters are v = 2, c = 4, and the depreciation rate is δ = 0.1. The left-
most distribution was created with λ = 0, that is, in line with the base-line
model in which all individuals always play the mixed equilibrium, and the
10There remains the knife-edge case when
w1 − w2 = ± 1
λ
ln
(
c
v
)
.
For the sake of brevity, we do not analyze this (presumably rare) case.
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Figure 10: The long-run distribution of individual wealth, for λ = 0 and
λ = 1, respectively.
right-most distribution was created for λ = 1. Hence, in almost all match-
ings, the rich individual then plays H and the poor D; they play the mixed
equilibrium only if they have identical wealth (more exactly if their wealth
difference is less than ln 2, which is always the case since this is less than 1,
the smallest unit of wealth). As expected, the greater λ results in higher av-
erage wealth: w¯ increases from approximately 10.2 to approximately 16.6.11
At the same time inequality rises; the standard deviation increases from
approximately 13.8 to approximately 16.9. Moreover, unlike in the original
model (λ = 0), a positive λ induces a "lock-in" effect: once rich, it is easier
for an individual to become even richer.
For the sake of brevity, we leave also this extension for future studies,
and note that this extension, unlike the first one, requires extension also of
the mathematical-statistical analysis.
6.3 Fixed background income
We have analyzed the strategic interaction as if it were the only source of
wealth. A simple and natural extension of the above analysis would be to let
all individuals also have other incomes, apart from playing the Hawk-Dove
game.12 To be specific, suppose that all individuals earn an exogenous and
fixed income y per unit of time, where y is an even positive integer. (This
income can be thought of as net income after consumption.) The income
adds to the individual’s wealth and is exposed to the same depreciation.
Such a steady income flow can be easily introduced in the present model by
adding wealth y/2 to both individuals after their strategic interaction. Since
the time rate at which an individual is called upon to play the game is 2, this
11At the same time, the median doubles, from 6 to 12.
12This is commonly asummed in evolutionary biology, where the payoffs earned in strate-
gic interactions often are viewed as small fitness increments, in addition to some fixed
background fitness.
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would result in an average income rate of y. Consequently, average steady-
state wealth would increase by y/δ. Technically, all results hold, mutatis
mutandi. In particular, the propagation of chaos equation (4) in Theorem 2
generalizes to
∂tP
[
W˜ (t) = w
]
= 2
(
1− v
c
)2
P
[
W˜ (t) = w − v/2− y/2
]
(30)
+ 2v
c
(
1− v
c
)(
P
[
W˜ (t) = w − v − y/2
]
+ P
[
W˜ (t) = w − y/2
])
+
(
v
c
)2 (
P
[
W˜ (t) = w − v − y/2
]
+ P
[
W˜ (t) = w + c− y/2
])
− 2P
[
W˜ (t) = w
]
− Dw.
Accordingly, the equations in the corollary generalize to
E
[
W˜ (t)
]
= α+ y/δ +K1e−δt ∀t ≥ 0 (31)
V ar
[
W˜ (t)
]
= (α+ y/δ)2+y2/δ+β2+
(
K2t+K3e−δt
)
e−δt ∀t ≥ 0. (32)
We note that unless the background income is very low (more precisely,
if y ≥ 2c), all individuals’ wealth is always non-negative.
7 Discussion
The present model is but a simple example of a more general modelling
paradigm, whereby economic activity takes place in small randomly assem-
bled groups. The members of each such group interact strategically with
each other, and the interaction may concern production, trade, bargaining,
public goods provision, etc. As a result of these interactions, individuals
gain or lose wealth.
The aim of the present study was to work out an analytical framework
that permits rigorous mathematical analysis, a framework that can later be
extended and generalized to richer and more realistic models. For instance,
instead of having only one game, there could be a family of games that are
randomly drawn, where the interacting individuals would learn what game
is at hand and adapt their behavior accordingly. It may also be relevant
to give individuals the option of not taking part in an interaction, which
can easily be done by adding a pure strategy, that if chosen by at least one
individual, leaves all individuals’ wealth levels untouched.13.
13However, in the Hawk-Dove game, this is of no or little interest, since abstension
from interaction would be weakly dominated by strategy D. More interesting would be
Prisoner’s dilemma games with an abstention option yielding a payoff between the payoff
under (D,D) and (C,C).
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We hope that the present model framework, in suitably extended forms,
may help understand mechanisms behind wealth distributions found in eco-
nomics, such as in the much discussed book by Piketty (2014). In a lucid
essay (in Swedish), Molander (2014) discusses how inequality may arise from
small variations at the micro level. More specifically, Molander shows how
even slight differences in bargaining power may induce wide wealth disper-
sion. The Hawk-Dove game can be interpreted as a rough bargaining model,
so the present study adds to that discussion. An interesting avenue for fur-
ther research would be to analyze a richer class of bargaining games within
the present framework.
We here model depreciation in a rather drastic way: now and then an
individual loses all his or her wealth. More realistically, small amounts
of wealth now and then become valueless. A more natural way to model
depreciation would then be to let each unit of wealth be exposed to i.i.d.
depreciation shocks. We avoided this second approach since it would seem
to make the "propagation of chaos" calculations much harder. However, it
would seem worthwhile to explore this possibility further, at least in numer-
ical simulations.
An important ingredient that is missing in the present model framework
is consumption. Of course, what we here call depreciation can be thought of
as consumption. However, this is a rather mechanical way of treating such an
activity. An extension to include endogenous consumption decisions would
be very valuable.
To mention but one more potential extensions: endogeneity of opportu-
nity values and their arrival rate. Arguably, the value and arrival rate of
opportunities for economic interactions is increasing in national wealth, at
any given population size. Such endogenous growth may turn the ergodic
wealth process into a so-called explosive Markov process. While such gen-
eralizations may raise substantial mathematical challenges, they would be
relevant for understanding real-world phenomena. With today’s computer
power, numerical simulations could give new insights and suggest conjec-
tures that later may be proved theoretically.
To the best of our knowledge, the present model is not closely related to
any model in the economics literature. It shares some features with some
models in the search literature, such as Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990).
The topics of wealth and growth are of course big in economics, but the
models used differ starkly from ours. Perhaps elaborations of the present
model could help shed more light on some of the issues treated there. Our
main contribution in this context is to provide a clear and rigorous math-
ematical framework, that, even in its present simple form generates wealth
distributions with features discussed in the economics literature. We believe
that even slight generalizations of the present model may enable rigorous
analysis of factors that determine not only national wealth but also the
wealth distribution within countries.
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8 Appendix
Let N ∈ N be population size, and let F denote the state-space, where
either F = ZN or F = R. A stochastic process X = (X(t))t≥0 in F is a
random variable taking values in D(R+, F ), the space of right-continuous
functions, from [0,+∞) to F , with left limits. To define a Markov process, or
continuous-time Markov chain, in F we need an initial distribution at time
zero, a probability measure pi on F , and a transition matrix, to be called the
rate matrix, denoted (A(x, y))x,y∈F , with A(x, x) = − ∑
y∈F\{x}
A(x, y). For
x 6= y, A(x, y) is the rate of transition of the process from state x to state
y. The generator associated with this matrix is the bounded linear operator
A that sends all bounded and Borel measurable functions f from F to R,
such that for all x ∈ F :
A [f(x)] =
∑
y∈F
A(x, y) · [f(y)− f(x)]
Conversely, from a given generator one can construct the associated rate
matrix from the factors by which the differences [f(y)−f(x)] are multiplied
in the expression of the generator.
Let A be a rate matrix and let pi be a probability measure on F . We can
construct a Markov process X as follows: First, let (Y (n))n be a Markov
chain in F with initial distribution pi and with transition matrix
( A(x,y)
|A(x,x)|
)
.14
Let ∆0, ∆1,. . . , be independent and exponentially distributed random vari-
ables with mean-value 1, the time intervals between arrivals, and assume
that they are statistically independent of the chain Y (.). Define the Markov
process (X(t))t in F , with initial distribution pi and generator A, by:
X(t) =

Y (0), 0 ≤ t < ∆0|A(Y (0),Y (0))|
Y (k),
k−1∑
j=0
∆j
|A(Y (j),Y (j))| ≤ t <
k∑
j=0
∆j
|A(Y (j),Y (j))|
(If A(x, x) = 0, then ∆/0 = +∞.)
8.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let N be a positive integer, and let (WNn )n∈N∗ be the Markov chain associ-
ated with the Markov process (WNt )t∈R+ . Evidently (WNn )n is an irreducible
chain on (γZ)N , where γ ∈ N is the greatest common divisor of v/2 and c.
Let [I] be the following hypothesis:
[I] ∃(p, q) ∈ N2 such that pv/2− qc = γ and 2q ∈ cN.
14We allow for the possibility that A(x, x) = 0, in which case we define the ratio A(x,y)|A(x,x)|
to equal 1 for only one state y ∈ F , the other terms being set to zero.
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Applying Bezout’s theorem (see e.g. Childs, 2009), there exists a pair
(p0, q0) of positive integers such that p0v/2 − q0c = γ. Let c′ = c/γ and
v′ = v/(2γ). Then
[I]⇔ (p0, q0) + (c′, v′)N = γN and (2q0 + v′N) ⊂ cN
⇔ (p0, q0) + (c′, v′)N = γN and 2q0 ∈ cN− v′N
By definition of γ: c and v′ are relatively prime. Hence, there exist positive
integers α, β such that αc− βv′ = 1, so cN− v′N = N. Consequently,
[I]⇔ (p0, q0) + (c′, v′)N = γN and 2q0 ∈ N,
where the second statement is always true by Bezout’s theorem. Hence, our
hypothesis [I] is always met. Let p and q be positive integers such that
pv/2− qc = γ, and define the positive integer K by K = 2q/c.
We proceed to show that the process
(
WNn
)
n
=
(
w1n, . . . , w
N
n
)
n
is ir-
reducible in (γZ)N , and will then use the following mappings from ZN to
ZN : 
DD(i, j) : w 7→ w + v/2ei + v/2ej
HD(i, j) : w 7→ w + vei
DH(i, j) : w 7→ w + vej
HH1(i, j) : w 7→ w + vei − cej
HH2(i, j) : w 7→ w − cei + vej
R1(i, j) : w 7→ w − wiei
R2(i, j) : w 7→ w − wjej
We denote by T this collection of mappings applications. For all integers
k ≥ h and i, j ∈ {1, . . . N} such that i 6= j, let fk,h(i, j) be the following
composition of mappings from the collection T :
fk,h(i, j) = (DD(i, j)hp)◦
(
DH (i, j)h
)
◦R2(i, j)◦
(
DD(i, j)(k−h)p
)
◦
(
HD(i, j)kq+Khv
)
We then get
fk,h(i, j) · (0, . . . , 0) = kγei + hγej .
For any positive integers k1 ≥ k2 ≥ · · · ≥ kN , let
F (k1, . . . , kN ) = fk1,k2(1, 2) ◦ fk3,k4(3, 4) ◦ · · · ◦ fkN−1,kN (N − 1, N)
for N even, and for N odd:
F (k1, . . . , kN ) = fk1,k2(1, 2) ◦ fk3,k4(3, 4) ◦ · · · ◦ fkN−2,kN−1(N − 2, N − 1) ◦R1(N − 1, N)
◦fkN−1,kN (N − 1, N).
We then have
F (k1, . . . , kN ) · (0, . . . , 0) = (k1γ, . . . , kNγ).
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We are now in a position to analyze the process WN . By definition,
Pw
[
g(WN1 )
]
) > 0
for all w ∈ ZN and all mappings g ∈ T . Hence, for all positive integers
k ≥ h and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that i 6= j:
P0
[
fk,h(i, j) ·WN1
]
> 0.
It follows that there exists an n0 ∈ N such that
P0
[
WNn0 = (k1γ, . . . , kNγ)
]
) = P0
[
WNn0 = F · (0, . . . , 0)
]
) > 0,
which establishes that
(
WNn
)
n
is irreducible in the state space (γZ)N . Hence,
by Theorem 1.7.7 in Norris (1997), the chain (WNn )n has a unique invariant
distribution, υ, on ZN .
It has the following ergodicity property: For all f ∈ Cb(ZN ) and all
initial states x ∈ ZN :
Px
 lim
n→+∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
f(WNk ) =
∑
x∈ZN
υ(x)f(x)
 = 1.
In other words, the time average of any function f ∈ Cb(ZN ) converges
with probability one to its mean-value under the invariant distribution.
This result follows from Theorem 1.10.2 in Norris (1997). Moreover since
P(0,0,...,0)
(
WN1 = (0, . . . , 0)
)
≥ δ/2 and δ > 0, the chain (WNn )n is also ape-
riodic. From this it follows (see Theorem 2.2.1 in Strook (2014) that there
exists a γ ∈ (0, 1) and a K ∈ R+ such that, for all initial states x ∈ ZN ,∑
y∈ZN
∣∣∣Px(WNn = y)− υ(y)∣∣∣ ≤ Kγn.
In particular, ∀x, y ∈ ZN , Px(WNn = y)→ υ(y).
8.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Let (uN )N∈N be a sequence of symmetric probability measures uN on ZN .
Following Sznitman (1991), we say that (uN )N is u-chaotic, with u a prob-
ability measure on Z, if, for any finite collection {φ1, . . . , φk} of continuous
and bounded functions on Z,
lim
N→+∞
∫
ZN
φ1(x1) . . . φk(xk)uN (dx1, . . . ,dxN ) =
k∏
i=1
∫
Z
φi(x)u(dx).
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The meaning of this definition, if we apply it to a fixed and finite number
of individuals, when the total numberN of individuals in the population goes
to infinity, these individuals’ wealth levels become i.i.d. with distribution u.
The infinitesimal generator of (WN1 , . . . ,WNN ) is ANg defined in (33). This
generator has the shape of a particle system with particles (or individuals)
playing 2×2-games. Then we adapt the proofs of Theorem 4.6 and Corollary
4.7 of Gibaud (2016). The generator of the full dimensional process AN with
domain Cb(ZN ) is: ∀f ∈ Cb(ZN ), ∀w = (w1, ..., wN ) ∈ RN
AN [f(w)] = ANd [f(w)] +
N∑
i=1
δ · [f(w − wiei)− f(w)],
with ei being the ith unit vector, andANd defined in (33). Considering f
constant everywhere except on the first component, we are in a position to
model the action on one individual the following generator L with domain
Cb(Z): ∀f ∈ Cb(Z), ∀w ∈ Z:
L [f(w)] = 2
N − 1pDD ·
[
f
(
w + v2
)
− f(w)
]
+ 2
N − 1pDH · [f(w + v)− f(w)]
+ 1
N − 1)pDD · ([f(w + v)− f(w)] + [f(w − c)− f(w)])
+ δ · [f(0)− f(w)].
Let us follow the proof of Lemma 4.8 in Gibaud (2016) in order to prove
that
(
L
(
WN1
))
N
is tight. We denote by (Ft)t the filtration such that
(WN (t))t is Ft-adapted. For the reasons given in Lemma 4.8, we then have
that, for all f ∈ Cb(Z),
f(WN1 (t))− f(WN1 (0))−
∫ t
0
L
[
f(WN1 (s))
]
ds
defines an Ft martingale. Since the jump rates are uniformly bounded in N
and the amplitudes of the jumps away from 0 are also uniformly bounded
in N , the tightness of
(
L
(
WN1
))
N
is obtained just as in Lemma 4.8.
We need a version of Lemma 4.9 in Gibaud (2016), which we here have
to rephrase in order to allow for depreciation. The generalized formulation
is as follows. First, for all pairs (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , N}2 with i 6= j, let N i,j
be the Poisson arrival process for the game when played by i and j. The
intensity of this process is 1/ (N − 1). For all individuals i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, let
N i be the Poisson arrival process for depreciation of the wealth of individual
i. The intensity of this process is δ.
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We recall that ∀k 6= h ∈ {1, . . . , N}2 and ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, N i and N i,j
are statistically independent. Define the associated compensated Poisson
processes as follows:(
Mi,j(t)
)
t
=
(
N i,j(t)− t
N − 1
)
t
and
(
Mi(t)
)
t
=
(
N i(t)− δt
)
t
Moreover, ∀s ≥ 0, write
∆f(WNi (s)) = 2pDD
[
f
(
WNi (s) +
v
2
)
− f(WNi (s))
]
+ 2pDH [f(WNi (s) + v)− f(WNi (s))]
+ pHH
(
[f(WNi (s) + v)− f(WNi (s))] + [f(WNi (s)− c)− f(WNi (s))]
)
The object of interest for us is
Mf,Ni (t) =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
∫ t
0
∆f(WNi (s))dMi,j(s) +
∫ t
0
[f(0)− f(Y Ni (s))]dMi(s).
For any individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, it can be shown that the processMf,Ni
is a square-integrable martingale, and that, for any N ∈ N∗ and all integers
0 < i 6= j ≤ N , there exists a constant Cf > 0 such that
E
(
Mf,Ni (t)M
f,N
j (t)
)
≤ C
f
N
.
In order to establish this, we take again use the proof of Lemma 4.9 in
Gibaud (2016). By the same arguments as given there, and noting thatMi
andMj are statistically independent for all i 6= j, we obtain
〈
Mi,Mj
〉
= 0.
By the same token: for all i 6= j and all k:
〈
Mi,j ,Mk
〉
= 0. As in the end
of the proof of Lemma 4.9 we get:
E(Mf,Ni M
f,N
j ) ≤
Cf
N
To finish the proof of the theorem, we follow the proof of Theorem 4.6
in Gibaud (2016). The modifications needed are in the proof of Lemma 4.10
and are:
1. We have to replace ∀t ≥ 0 : (X(t), Z(t)) by (X(t)) and Lµu by L.
2. We have to replace (Y Ni ;ZNi ) by (WNi ) (and then ∀s ≥ 0 (Y Ni (s), ZNi )
is replaced by WNi (s))
3. f(Y Ni (T ))− f(Y Ni (t)) = . . . is replaced by:
f(WNi (T ))− f(WNi (t)) =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
∫ T
t
∆f(Y Ni (s))dN i,j(s) +
∫ T
t
[f(0)− f(Y Ni (s))]dN i(s)
= Mf,Ni (T )−Mf,Ni (t) +
∫ T
t
Lf(Y Ni (s))ds
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4. G
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
δWNi
)
becomes less than 1N
N∑
i=1
(
Mf,Ni (T )−Mf,Ni (t)
)
gNi
5. Then we get
E
(∣∣∣∣∣G
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
δWNi
)∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ E
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
(
Mf,Ni (T )−Mf,Ni (t)
)
gNi
∣∣∣∣∣
)
:= A
The fact that A2 → 0 when N → +∞ is proved in Lemma 4.10 of
Gibaud (2016).
6. The evolution equations in Thm 3.2 are developed on the basis of
Gibaud (2016), by replacing
(a) (X,Z) by (X)
(b) R+ × {0, 1} by R
(c) 1(y,0) by 1k with k ∈ Z and 1X=y
z=0
by 1X=k
7. We finally obtain that P(W˜ (t) = k)− P(W˜ (0) = k) equals
2pDD
[
P(W˜ (t) + v/2 = k)− P(W˜ (t) = k)
]
+ 2pHD
[
P(W˜ (t) + v = k)− P(W˜ (t) = k)
]
+ pHH
[(
P(W˜ (t) + v = k)− P(W˜ (t) = k)
)
+
(
P(W˜ (t)− c = k)− P(W˜ (t) = k)
)]
+ δ
[
1k=0 − P(W˜ (t) = k)
]
.
This results in equations (4).
8.3 Proof of Corollary 3.3
Let us denote: uw = P(W˜ (t) = w). Then we have for all w ∈ Z\{0}
∂tuw = 2
(c− v)2
c2
uw− v2 + 2
(c− v)v
c2
(uw−v + uw) +
v2
c2
uw−v +
v2
c2
uw+c − 2uw − δuw
= uw− v2 ·
2(c− v)2
c2
+ uw−v
[
2(c− v)v
c2
+ v
2
c2
]
+ uw+c · v
2
c2
+ uw
[2(c− v)v
c2
− 2− δ
]
We denote by m1 and m2 the first and second moments of W˜ (t):
m1 =
∑
w∈Z
w · uw m2 =
∑
w∈Z
w2 · uw.
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Then
∂tm1 =
∑
w∈Z\{0}
w · ∂tuw
= 2(c− v)
2
c2
∑
w∈Z
w · uw− v2 +
[
2(c− v)v
c2
+ v
2
c2
] ∑
w∈Z
w · uw−v
+ v
2
c2
∑
w∈Z
w · uw+c +
[2(c− v)v
c2
− 2− δ
] ∑
w∈Z
w · uw
= 2(c− v)
2
c2
· (m1 + v2) +
[
2(c− v)v
c2
+ v
2
c2
]
· (m1 + v)
+ v
2
c2
· (m1 − c) +
[2(c− v)v
c2
− 2− δ
]
·m1
Hence,
∂tm1 =
v(c− v)
c
− δm1
Then
m1 =
v(c− v)
δc
+K1e−δt
for some K1 ∈ R.
Likewise:
∂tm2 =
∑
w∈Z\{0}
w2 · ∂tuw
= 2(c− v)
2
c2
∑
w∈Z
(
w − v2 +
v
2
)2
· uw− v2 +
[
2(c− v)v
c2
+ v
2
c2
] ∑
w∈Z
(w − v + v)2 · uw−v
+ v
2
c2
∑
w∈Z
(w + c− c)2 · uw+c +
[2(c− v)v
c2
− 2− δ
] ∑
w∈Z
w2 · uw
= 2(c− v)
2
c2
(
m2 + vm1 +
v2
4
)
+
[
2(c− v)v
c2
+ v
2
c2
]
·
(
m2 + 2vm1 + v2
)
+ v
2
c2
·
(
m2 − 2cm1 + c2
)
+
[2(c− v)v
c2
− 2− δ
]
·m2
= 2am1 − δm2 + v
2
2c2 ·
(
2c2 − v2 + 2vc
)
= 2am1 − δm2 + v
2
2
[
3−
(
1− v
c
)2]
Thus:
m2 = K2te−δt +K3e−δt +
[
2 ·
(
v(c− v)
cδ
)2
+ v
2
2c2δ ·
(
3−
(
1− v
c
)2)]
.
for K2,K3 ∈ R. The obtained expressions form1 andm2 lead to the claimed
expressions.
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8.4 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Denote by C∞c (F ) the set of real-valued smooth (infinitely differentiable)
functions defined on F . We denote Cb(F ) the space of continuous and
bounded functions from F to R. ‖.‖∞ represents the sup norm in the
bounded functions and |||.||| the operator norm on Cb(F ), that is, |||L||| =
supf∈Cb(F )
‖Lf‖∞
‖f‖∞ . We divide the construction of the Markov process W
N =
(WN1 , . . . ,WNN ) in two parts; the random matching to play the game, and
depreciation of wealth.
[Part 1: the game playing] A Poisson process with intensity N draws
a pair of individuals to play the game, and update their personal wealth
according to the description in Section 2. At each pairwise match, the two
individuals make their choices simultaneously and independently. If all in-
dividuals use the unique ESS strategy x∗, then the interaction between an
individual i and an individual j is: (D,D) with probability pDD = (1− v/c)2,
(D,H) or (H,D) with probability pDH = (1− v/c) v/c, (H,H) with probabil-
ity pHH = (v/c)2. The generator associated to this part of the wealth
process is ANg with domain Cb(RN ) and defined, ∀f ∈ Cb(RN ), ∀w ∈ RN ,
by:
ANg [f(w)] = N ·
∑
(i,j)∈{1,...N}2
i 6=j

pDD
N(N−1) · [f(w + v(ei + ej)/2)− f(w)]
+ pDHN(N−1) · [f(w + v ei)− f(w)]
+ pDHN(N−1) · [f(w + v ej)− f(w)]
+ pHHN(N−1) ·
[
1
2 (f(w + v ei − c ej)− f(w))
+12 (f(w + v ej − c ei)− f(w))
]

where {e1, . . . eN} is the canonical basis of RN .
[Part 2: Depreciation] To deal with depreciation, we define an indepen-
dent Poisson process, also with intensity N . At each arrival time of this
Poisson process one individual is randomly drawn for wealth depreciation,
as described in Section 2.
We here consider a more general depreciation process, whereby depre-
ciation is not total depleting. Instead, when an individual is drawn for de-
preciating, his or her wealth probabilistically decreases, if positive, or prob-
abilistically increases, if negative. In other words, an individual’s wealth
does not change sign but probabilistically shrinks in absolute value. For any
k ∈ N, let ρkh = P(Bin(k, δ) = h). We denote Ik = {0, . . . , k} if k > 0 and
Ik = {−k, . . . , 0} if k < 0, and I0 = {0}. In the case of depreciation by
complete depletion, treated in the main text, we let ρkh = δ · 1k=h.
The depreciation action has a generator ANd with domain Cb(ZN ), de-
fined ∀f ∈ Cb(ZN ) and ∀w ∈ ZN by
ANd [f(w)] =
N∑
i=1
∑
h∈Iwi
ρwih [f(w − hei)− f(w)]
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Having defined the two generators ANg and ANd , the generator AN of the
Markov process WN is defined ∀f ∈ Cb(ZN ), ∀w ∈ ZN by
AN [f(w)] = ANg [f(w)] +ANd [f(w)] (33)
We are now in a position to construct the Markov process that defines
average wealth. The evolution of average wealth (w¯N (t))t is determined by
A¯N (µN ), where µN is the empirical measure described in Section 2, and A¯N
is a non-linear generator defined as follows. For any probability measure
m on Z, A¯N (m) is the generator with domain Cb(R) defined ∀f ∈ Cb(R)
∀w ∈ R by
A¯N (m) [f(w)] = A¯Ng [f(w)] + A¯Nd (m) [f(w)] ,
where
A¯Ng [f(w)] = N
 pDD
[
f
(
w + vN
)− f(w)]
+2pHD
[
f
(
w + vN
)− f(w)]
+pHH
[
f
(
w + v−cN
)− f(w)]

and
A¯Nd (m) [f(w)] = N
∑
k∈Z
m(k)
∑
h∈Ik
ρkh
[
f
(
w − h
N
)
− f(w)
]
In order to establish the claim in Prop 4.1, we proceed to prove that,
as N goes to +∞, A¯N converges (as operator on C∞c (R)) to A¯, defined
∀f ∈ C∞c (R) and ∀w ∈ R by
A¯ [f(w)] =
[
v(1− v
c
)
]
f ′(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A¯g
−δwf ′(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A¯d
Indeed, for all m ∈ ∆ (Z):
|||A¯N (m)− A¯||| ≤ |||A¯Ng − A¯g||| + |||A¯Nd (m)− A¯d|||
Moreover, for all f ∈ C∞c (R), w ∈ R and m ∈ ∆ (Z): (since m is a proba-
bility measure, and since for all k ∈ Z that ∑h∈Ik hρkh = −δ)
∣∣∣A¯Nd (m) [f(w)]− (−δf ′(w))∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣N
∑
k∈Z
m(k)
∑
h∈Ik
ρkh[f(w − h/N)− f(w)] + δf ′(w)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈Z
m(k)(−δf ′(w)) + δf ′(w) + o(1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Since f is smooth with compact support, the term o(1) is compactly sup-
ported and goes to zero as N goes to +∞. The same reasoning applied to
|||A¯Ng − A¯g||| establishes that the operator converges.
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We recognize A¯N as the generator of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with
σ = 0. Hence, a process associated with A¯ is (w¯(t))t, defined by
dw¯(t) =
(
(v − v
2
c
)− δw¯(t)
)
dt (34)
Finally, since we have established the convergence of the generators,
applying Thm 6.1 of Chapter 3 in Ethier and Kurtz (1986) [with, for all
n ∈ N, pin being the injection from Ln = C∞c (R) to L = Cb(R)], we have the
following convergence result,
Ew0
[
f(w¯N (t))
]
−→ w¯(t),
for all w0 ∈ R, f ∈ C∞c (R) and t > 0, where w¯ (·) is the solution of (34)
with initial condition w(0) = w0.
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